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Shared Partisanship, Household Norms and Turnout:
Testing a Relational Theory of Electoral Participation
EDWARD FIELDHOUSE AND DAVID CUTTS*
Previous research shows that the household context is a crucial source of inﬂuence on turnout. This
article sets out a relational theory of voting in which turnout is dependent on the existence of relational
selective consumption beneﬁts. The study provides empirical tests of key elements of the proposed model
using household survey data from Great Britain. First, building on expressive theories of voting, it
examines the extent to which shared partisan identiﬁcation enhances turnout. Secondly, extending
theories of voting as a social norm, it tests whether the civic norms of citizens’ families or households
affect turnout over and above the social norms of the individual. In accordance with expectations of
expressive theories of voting, it ﬁnds that having a shared party identiﬁcation with other members of the
household increases turnout. It also ﬁnds that the civic duty of other household members is important in
explaining turnout, even when allowing for respondent’s civic duty.
A growing body of research shows that the household context is a powerful source of inﬂuence
on turnout.1 For example, in Britain the probability that a citizen living with a voter will also
vote is as high as 90 per cent, compared to only 10 per cent for a citizen living with a
non-voter.2 Building on early work from the Columbia school, which highlighted the role of
social inﬂuences on electoral behaviour,3 and more recent work on social network effects, the
social transmission of messages4 and interpersonal mobilization,5 this article sets out a relational
theory of voting. We provide preliminary empirical tests of the key elements of the proposed
model using data from Great Britain.
Central to our approach is an understanding of turnout as a socially embedded activity.6 The
dominant view in social models of participation is that social intimates grow more alike through
long-term processes of socialization7 and interpersonal inﬂuence.8 We argue that the strong
interdependence of voting in families (and other close-knit groups) arises because socially
connected people motivate each other to vote at election time, either deliberately or otherwise,
and these short-term inﬂuences can have lasting effects through social leaning and habituation.
* School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester (email: ed.ﬁeldhouse@manchester.ac.uk); Department
of Politics, Languages and International Relations, University of Bath (email: djc54@bath.ac.uk). Professor
Fieldhouse’s involvement in this research was supported by ESRC research grant ES/L005166/1.
Data replication sets are available at http://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/BJPolS and online appendices are
available at http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0007123416000089.
1 Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007.
2 Cutts and Fieldhouse 2009.
3 Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944.
4 Bond et al. 2012.
5 Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; McClurg 2003; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Zuckerman 2007. For a
discussion of using experimental designs speciﬁcally related to the household, see Nickerson 2008;
Sinclair 2012.
6 Sinclair 2012.
7 Jennings and Niemi 1981.
8 Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995.
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Voters take into account the norms and behaviour of their reference group, as well as their
personal costs and beneﬁts. The inﬂuential role played by intimates means that turning out to
vote is highly dependent on whether the people they live with are voters or not.
Below we outline our social–relational theory of turnout, which emphasizes
external–selective consumption motivations including normative and symbolic elements. We
identify two complimentary phenomena that help explain the turnout decision in general and
household patterns of turnout in particular. First, building on expressive theories of voting,9 we
examine the extent to which shared partisan identiﬁcation might enhance turnout. Secondly,
extending theories of voting as a social norm,10 we test whether the civic norms of citizens’
families or households affect turnout over and above the social norms of the individuals
themselves.
MOTIVATIONS TO VOTE: WHY TURNOUT IS A SOCIAL PHENOMENA
Social theories of voting commonly identify two crucial processes ways in which social
networks inﬂuence turnout. First, over the long term, citizens who are socially connected grow
more alike through socialization processes.11 Secondly, in the short term, connected citizens
inﬂuence each other’s attitudes and behaviour through interpersonal inﬂuence and
mobilization.12 While these processes are crucial to understanding voter turnout, they do not
explain why people vote, only how citizens may inﬂuence each other. We argue that the
underlying motivations – that are learned through interpersonal inﬂuence and socialization – are
themselves based, in part, on social relationships.
Plenty of scholars have incorporated group-based interests and social inﬂuence into theories
of participation.13 In group-based models, voters’ interests are in some way dependent on their
membership of groups or networks, and members of those networks have greater incentives to
vote compared to isolated individuals. Interaction within social networks can reduce
information costs,14 determine relational beneﬁts,15 and determine the costs and beneﬁts of
fulﬁlling social norms.16 In practice, this means that the turnout decision is, in part, a function of
whether others in their social circle also vote. The idea of the conditional voter naturally leads to
a prediction that voting (or the intention to vote) may spread though social networks leading to
voting ‘cascades’ and bandwagon effects.17
In order to disentangle the multiple ways in which social factors can inﬂuence turnout, we
disaggregate the fundamental motivations of voting and then identify the social dimension of
each component. There are three main types of underlying motivations to vote. First,
instrumental motivations reﬂect outcome-related beneﬁts and costs—in other words, the
expected utility derived from a preferred candidate or party being elected. Following minimal
rational choice theories, this utility is derived from voters’ policy preferences and candidates’
policy positions.18 Secondly, symbolic motivations stem from the expressive beneﬁts derived
9 Brennan and Lomasky 1993; Schuessler 2000.
10 Coleman 1990.
11 Jennings and Niemi 1981.
12 Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993.
13 Abrams, Iversen, and Soskice 2011; Knack 1992; McClurg 2003; Morton 1991; Rosenstone and Hansen
1993; Sinclair 2012.
14 Converse 1962.
15 Uhlaner 1989.
16 Knack 1992.
17 Fowler 2005; Rolfe 2012.
18 Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968.
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from supporting a particular candidate, which are reserved for those who participate.19 Thirdly,
normative motivations reﬂect the social norms of voting (for example, civic duty) and the
associated sanctions for non-compliance.20
Together with the cost of voting, these sets of motivations provide a micro-foundation for a
relational model of turnout. Each of these types of motivation may be organized according to
whether they depend on the election outcome, and whether they are individual (egocentric),
socially motivated but internalized or externally motivated (relational) (Table 1). Individual or
egocentric motivations are those solely driven by personal beneﬁts or objectives. Internal social
motivations are those that depend on considering the interests of others, but do not require
social interaction, because the relevant attitudes or norms are internalized (for example, ethical
voting). In other words, these motivations constitute an expression of what the individual thinks
they ought to do. In social psychology these are sometimes referred to as personal normative
beliefs.21 The widely used notion of (the personal sense of) civic duty belongs in this category.
In contrast we consider external or relational motivations as those that depend on direct
knowledge of the behaviour or attitudes of others or some actual or anticipated social interaction
or transaction. These include both what social psychologists refer to as behavioural
(or descriptive) norms (what the individual thinks others actually do) and normative
expectations or subjective norms (what the individual believes referents think she should
do). These are not necessarily manifested in the expressed personal normative beliefs of the
individual but may be revealed by responses in behaviour. For example, the knowledge that a
social intimate might disapprove of abstention may not be reﬂected in an individual’s belief in
the duty of voting, but may still affect his turnout behaviour. This subtle but important
distinction between social motives that are internalized and those that require social interaction
underpins the relational theory of turnout and drives the hypotheses tested in this article.
Crucially, the strength of these relational motivations to vote is largely dependent on the number
TABLE 1 A Classiﬁcation of Turnout Motivations
Outcome-related costs and beneﬁts Selective consumption costs and beneﬁts
Egoist or
individual
Expected utility (Downs 1957);
Satisﬁcing (Bendor et al. 2003)
Self-expression/intrinsic pleasures of
voting (Fiorina 1976)
Type: instrumental Type: symbolic, instrumental
Internal social Altruism (Goodin and Roberts 1975);
rule-utilitarian voter (Harsanyi 1980)
Personal normative beliefs – civic duty
(Blais 2000)
Type: instrumental Type: normative
External social
(relational)
Group pivotal voter/sufﬁciency model
(Schelling 1978); relational beneﬁts
(Uhlaner 1989)
Subjective/injunctive norms – social
approval/disapproval (Gerber, Green
and Larimer 2010); Expressive voting/
social identity (Schuessler 2000);
Companion effects (Fieldhouse and
Cutts 2012)
Type: instrumental Type: symbolic, normative and
instrumental
19 Brennan and Lomasky 1993; Schuessler 2000.
20 Knack 1992.
21 Bicchieri 2015.
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of other people who vote in the citizen’s social network, particularly among family, friends and
acquaintances who share a partisan afﬁliation.
Table 1 denotes how the three types of motivation described above (instrumental, normative
and symbolic) map onto the intersection of the individual–social and outcome–process
dimensions of the turnout decision. Unlike previous approaches, which have focused largely on
the group aspects of outcome-related motives22 and on internalized social norms, especially
civic duty,23 we make the case for incorporating relational–selective consumption motivations
into a relational theory of voting. In this article we focus on two key components of these
relational consumption beneﬁts:
(1) Norms of voting – shared personal beliefs about desirable behaviour enforced through the
process of social approval and disapproval. These are most inﬂuential when applied by
family members and close intimates.
(2) Expressive beneﬁts – the beneﬁts to voters of expressing their views and thereby identifying
with a social group that they regard as desirable.
There is also a social dimension of the costs of voting. Costs may be reduced by sharing the
experience of voting, for example attending the polling station together or sharing information
about candidates. Moreover, voters may also use the decisions of intimates as a heuristic by
imitating the turnout behaviour of referents whose opinions they respect, thus saving cognitive
processing and information costs. However, while we include a simple indicator of the costs of
voting in the empirical models presented below, for data availability reasons we do not test this
aspect of the theory in this article.
Consumption Beneﬁts, Social Norms and Civic Duty
In order to overcome the paradox of voting and ‘free-rider’ problems, Riker and Ordeshook
extended Downs’ model of voting to include the notion of citizen duty and other beneﬁts that
are not dependent on the outcome (the D term).24 Crucially, these selective beneﬁts are only
enjoyed by electors who actually vote, thereby sidestepping the collective action problem.
Fiorina described these more generally as consumption beneﬁts, in contrast to investment
(outcome-related) beneﬁts. Because consumption beneﬁts, such as civic duty, are not dependent
on the outcome of the election, they are not discounted by the factor probability (P) of any vote
being decisive.25 As it is widely believed that the costs of voting are non-negligible, albeit low,
this places considerable emphasis on the D term.26 Despite its importance in explaining
individual-level turnout, the concept of civic duty as an explanation for voting behaviour has
generated considerable criticism. There is clear evidence that voters around the world agree that
citizens have the duty to vote. For example, Blais reports that more than 90 per cent of citizens
of two Canadian provinces agree that ‘it is the duty of every citizen to vote’,27 while in the
United States in 2000 the proportion was over 70 per cent.28
Whereas research consistently shows that civic duty is correlated with turnout, others have
pointed out that the explanation is little more than tautology. Including civic duty simply serves
22 Morton 1991; Uhlaner 1989.
23 Knack 1992.
24 Riker and Ordeshook 1968.
25 Fiorina 1976.
26 Aldrich 1993.
27 Blais 2000.
28 Blais and Achen 2010.
4 FIELDHOUSE AND CUTTS
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000089
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 81.141.244.78, on 05 Apr 2017 at 12:25:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
to move the puzzle from why people vote to why people believe it is a duty to vote.29 Coleman
outlines a general theory of the demand and realization of effective norms that can be applied to
voting that avoids this problem. According to Coleman, citizens forego their right to determine
their own action (whether or not to vote) in order to satisfy the demand for a norm of voting.30
The demand arises due to the externalities that are incurred if others collectively decide not to
conform (that is, to abstain). These externalities might include the breakdown of democracy or
extremist candidates being elected by a small number of votes. Beneﬁciaries of the norm may
enforce compliance though the use of sanctions including social approval or disapproval, or in a
more serious breach ostracism and social rejection. Norms are said to be internalized when
external sanctioning becomes unnecessary, and the individual develops an internal sanctioning
system of their own that discourages departure from the norm (for example, a sense of duty).
A number of predictions ﬂow from this that are consistent with the empirical evidence on
voting. One is that when individuals are removed from social networks that encourage voting,
they will be less likely to vote. Residential mobility (and a subsequent weakening of social
networks) is often found to be negatively related to turnout.31 A second prediction is that an
individual embedded in social networks in which the norm of voting is less prevalent
(or has as contacts with others who are not norm holders) will be less likely to conform. Thirdly,
get-out-the-vote experiments using communication strategies aimed at manipulating social
pressures have exhibited much greater mobilization effects than conventional rational or civic
appeals.32 In their review of social pressure experiments, Green and Gerber argue that calling
attention to past non-voting is particularly effective, as is the threat of ‘shaming’
non-compliers.33 They ﬁnd that it is unnecessary to persuade electors of the importance of
civic duty; it is sufﬁcient to draw attention to the fact that their participation (or lack thereof) is
being observed. Similarly, Abrams, Iversen and Soskice ﬁnd support for a model of turnout
based on the inﬂuence of social pressures within informal social networks, in which socially
embedded individuals respond to the effect of voting on their social standing.34 Knack argues
that declining social connectedness may be responsible for the declining turnout through the
weakening of social pressures.35
As noted above, in order to differentiate the relational selective consumption beneﬁts from
those that are internally motivated, it is necessary to distinguish between personal normative
beliefs (such as civic duty), behavioural norms (perceptions of whether referents actually vote)
and subjective normative expectations. This is reﬂected in our hypotheses and model
speciﬁcation below.
Expressive Voting and Social Identity
While the D term has commonly been equated with civic duty or norms of voting, the idea of
voting as an act of consumption can also be extended to expressive theories of voting.36 As with
civic duty, according to the expressive logic, voting is an act of expression rather than of
investment. Expressive voters derive beneﬁts from taking part in an election, or more
29 Barry 1970.
30 Coleman 1990.
31 Dowding, John, and Rubenson 2012.
32 Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2010; Panagopolous 2010.
33 Green and Gerber 2010.
34 Abrams, Iversen, and Soskice 2011.
35 Knack 1992.
36 Brennan and Lomasky 1993.
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speciﬁcally from giving their support to a particular candidate or party, like a football fan
gains pleasure from supporting his team. Voters enjoy beneﬁts from expressing their views and
thereby identifying with a social group they regard as desirable. The idea of voting as an
expression of social identity is consistent with research on partisanship, which likens the sense
of belonging to a political party to other social identities based on belonging to a particular
ethnic or religious group, social class or political cause.37 By this account, voting is an act of
identiﬁcation – that is, it is about ‘being’ rather than ‘doing’.38 Thus expressive voting reﬂects
the voter’s social identity, and the expressive beneﬁts derived vary according to the number and
identity of other supporters of that candidate. In short, as the number of other like-minded voters
supporting the same candidate increases, so too do the expressive beneﬁts enjoyed by the voter.
The amount and character of support for a candidate may be partially gleaned from mass
media (such as opinion polls) and partly from social networks. Even though expressive
motivations could theoretically exist for socially isolated individuals, the expression of approval
or disapproval for a candidate will have greater resonance if expressed as part of a group.39
Expressive beneﬁts stem from the satisfaction derived from being part of a group of like-minded
voters, and expressing their opinion. According to Schuessler, it is not necessary to know other
supporters personally, but simply to regard the group in a positive way. Moreover, in this
account expressive voting matters not only in public but also in private.40 Sinclair suggests that
citizens take cues from friends and family rather than from society at large.41 We hypothesize
that the shared experience of supporting a party that close friends or family also support will
enhance the expressive beneﬁts. If voting is about ‘being’ rather than ‘doing’, then ‘being’ a
Democrat or a Republican is best enjoyed with social intimates who share that afﬁliation. In this
sense, expressive voting is relational as opposed to simply ‘social’ (as depicted in Table 1
above). By explicitly linking expressive beneﬁts to social identity theory, Schuessler provides a
plausible micro foundation for why people vote, and at the same time, by implication, why
turnout clusters within social networks and households.42
HYPOTHESES
Relational Factors: Household Norms of Voting
Following from the discussion above, social norms are relational in so far as friends, family,
colleagues and other acquaintances may enforce them (for example, by voicing approval/
disapproval or withdrawing respect). This small personal network of family members and close
intimates, whose opinion and approval is valued, often determines an individual’s intention to
vote. While it is not possible to gauge from individual-level survey data the extent to which
norms are internalized vs. dependent on social interactions (that is, the extent to which they are
relational), we are able to use household hierarchical data to test whether the norms of intimates
are relevant beyond those of the individual. As Knack notes, ‘voter participation is a function of
one’s own sense of duty, of the strength of duty of one’s family, friends’.43 Thus normative
relational motivations can be measured by the personal normative beliefs of a citizen’s social
intimates (measured by household members’ conceptions of civic duty) and, as indicated above,
37 Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002.
38 Schuessler 2000.
39 Franklin 2004.
40 Schuessler 2000.
41 Sinclair 2012.
42 Schuessler 2000.
43 Knack 1992, 12.
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may not necessarily be manifested in the respondent’s own personal normative beliefs
(personal civic duty), but may be reﬂected in their voting decision. If household relational
factors are not important, then the civic duty of others should have no additional impact on the
probability of voting after allowing for the civic duty of the respondent and the impact of
descriptive (or ‘behavioural’) norms (measured by the perception that ‘most people around here
usually vote in general elections’). However, if the civic duty of others does have an
independent impact, then this suggests that social norms also have a relational component. This
gives rise to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: Household civic duty will have an independent and additional inﬂuence on voter
turnout after allowing for individual-level civic duty and descriptive norms of
voting.
Relational Factors: Expressive Motives and Shared Partisanship
Using similar reasoning, to operationalize our conceptualization of relational expressive voting,
we employ a measure of whether or not party identiﬁcation is shared with other members of the
household. Following the discussion above, express motivations will be enhanced if citizens
share a partisan identiﬁcation with their social intimates. This leads to our second hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: Citizens who share a party identiﬁcation with other members of their household
will be more likely to vote than those who are the only party identiﬁer in the
household, or those whose fellow household members identify with a
different party.
DATA AND METHODS
Our initial testing of our theory draws on data from Great Britain. From the perspective of
studying turnout, the 2010 British general election is unremarkable with an overall turnout rate
of 65 per cent. However, it is a useful laboratory for testing our relational model of voting due to
the availability of high-quality household panel data that include most of the indicators we need
to operationalize our model. More speciﬁcally, these data are from the UK household
longitudinal survey dataset ‘Understanding Society’ (USoc). Using multi-stage survey designs
with stratiﬁcation and clustering, it provides nationally representative data at the individual and
household levels across a range of substantive areas.44 We use data from Wave 2 of USoc
because it contains a political engagement module that corresponds to the UK 2010 general
election and complements the other politics modules from this wave of the USoc panel.
However, this political engagement module is only asked of a subsample of respondents. Our
main sample consists of 8,337 individuals who were nested in 5,101 households, including
2,532 single-person households.
Model Speciﬁcation
The hierarchical nature of the sample suggests that simultaneous modelling of individual and
household variation (known as hierarchical or multilevel modelling) is the most appropriate
model speciﬁcation. This provides a framework for exploring how relationships vary across
hierarchical structures, whether these are natural or introduced in the sample design. Our model
has individuals at level 1 nested within households at level 2. The model has two parts: (1) a ﬁxed
44 For more details, see https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk.
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part that contains estimates of the average relationship between vote intention and the predictor
variables across households and individuals and (2) a random part that estimates the size of the
between-household variation relative to the within-household, between-individual variation.45
Because we are interested in turnout as a binary outcome, a multilevel logistic regression
model is speciﬁed. It is possible to illustrate the two-level model for a binary outcome using a
single predictor variable in the following way. Given that our data consist of individuals
(level 1) grouped into households (level 2), we observe yij, which is a binary response (vote
intention) for individual i in household j, β0 is the intercept, xij is a predictor variable
at the individual level and β1 is its effect. The probability of the response (vote intention) is equal
to 1 as pij = Pr(yij = 1), where pij is modelled using the logit link function.
46 We assume
that the binary outcome yij has a Bernoulli distribution. The equation can therefore be written
as follows:
log½pij = ð1pijÞ= β0 + β1Xij + uj; (1)
where uj is the random effect at level 2 (household level) and is assumed to follow a normal or
Gaussian distribution, which is conventionally summarized by the between-household
variance term.
Conditional on uj, it is assumed σ2u0 that yijs are independent.
47 All the multilevel models were
ﬁtted using MLwiN 2.26 using the conventional penalized quasi-likelihood estimation method.
Dependent Variable: Using Vote Intention
It is not only attitudinal interdependence that may create similarity of intention, but also
behavioural cues (‘voting together’). Because USoc only collected data on motivations for
participation for a subsample of respondents and collected actual voting data from another
subsample, we focus here on vote intention rather than vote. More speciﬁcally, in our main
models the dependent variable is whether or not the respondent scored 8 or more on the vote
intention scale in contrast to all other vote intentions.48 This effectively excludes the
behavioural components of voting, which are dependent on election day stimuli or ‘companion
effects’ such as the beneﬁts of walking to the polling station together.49 Fortunately, however,
because a fraction of the USoc sample completed both the ‘General Election’ and the ‘politics’
modules, we are able to repeat the models (albeit with a much smaller sample) on reported vote
(as well as vote intention).50 However, because of a large difference in sample size the main
45 Goldstein 2003; Jones 1997.
46 Guo and Zhao 2000.
47 A multilevel model with a binary outcome can also be derived by assuming that there exists a latent
continuous variable yij underlying yij. In simple terms, we know that y

ij > 0 if yij = 1 and y

ij ≤ 0 if yij = 1. So an
equivalent multilevel model can be derived that is equivalent to Equation 1, where yij = β0 + β1xij+ uj + eij.
48 Respondents were asked on a scale from 0–10 (where 0 = no intention; 10 = strongly intend to vote)
whether they intended to vote in the general election. The distribution was highly skewed, removing any
possibility of treating the variable as continuous; 48.2 per cent of those sampled stated that they strongly intended
to vote (score of 10), whereas 64.4 per cent of the sample gave a response of 8 or more, a ﬁgure almost identical
to the actual UK General Election turnout (65.1 per cent). Analysis after the election using the same likelihood to
vote question was carried out using the 2010 British Election Study. This showed that while around 80 per cent
of respondents scoring 8 or more actually voted, this ﬁgures drops for values of 7 or below. Consequently we use
the 8–10 measure but also provide the results for vote intention (10) in Appendix Table A2. We found little or no
differences between the two measures, with no changes in the signiﬁcance of key or other control variables.
49 Fieldhouse and Cutts 2012.
50 We use the variance partition coefﬁcient (VPC) to measure the proportion of the total residual variance that
is attributable to the higher-level unit (in our case household). Where the response is binary (as in our case), there
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analyses focus on vote intention. It should be remembered that this effectively excludes factors
that might account for the strength (or weakness) of the link between intention and behaviour.51
Using vote intention as the dependent variable is therefore likely to provide a conservative
estimate of household effects. Models of actual vote with the reduced sample are reported in
Appendix Table A1.
Key Independent Variables
To test the relational household component of social norms (Hypothesis 1), we include a
measure of the civic duty of other members of the household alongside the standard civic duty
measure.52 As an additional indicator and stricter control, we also include a variable measuring
descriptive norms (whether ‘most people around here usually vote in general elections’). To test
the impact of relational expressive motivations (Hypothesis 2) – that is, that citizens who share a
party identiﬁcation with other members of their household will be more likely to vote – we
include a combined measure of the partisan composition of the individual and household. This
is coded as a categorical variable, Household Partisanship, which differentiates between sole
partisans (individuals who are the only party identiﬁer in the household), opposing partisans
(where another household member has a different party identiﬁcation to the respondent), shared
partisans (where partisanship is shared with at least one member of the household) and non-
partisans. Single-person households are coded separately with a dummy variable and are not
considered to score on household civic duty or shared partisanship. To ensure we do not
conﬂate the effect of shared partisanship with the simple effect of partisanship, the reference
category is ‘sole partisan’.
As far as possible given the available data, we take account of internal and individual
motivations to vote as set out in Table 1. We include two indicators that reﬂect the internal
social beneﬁts of voting: civic duty and group beneﬁts. The latter is deﬁned as the extent to
which people agree that ‘voting is a good way to get beneﬁts for groups that people care about,
like pensioners and the disabled’.53 To reﬂect the existence of individual or egoist motivations
to vote – those primarily driven by personal beneﬁts or objectives – we include satisfaction
gained from voting and personal feelings towards the most-favoured party. The latter is an
indicator of egocentric expressive motives to vote. By including this at the individual level we
can rule out the possibility that any differences between sole partisans and shared partisans are
simply the result of differences in the strength of attachment to parties between the two groups
(that is, that shared partisans are simply more partisan).54 The model also contains a number of
(F’note continued)
is no single measure of the VPC primarily because the level-1 variance is a function of the mean and is reliant on
the strength of predictor models in the actual model. A common method is to treat the binary outcome as a latent
continuous variable. We regard the underlying variable eij as a standard logistic distribution with a variance of
3.29 to compute the VPC. We use this method to calculate the VPC in the tables.
51 Azjen and Fishbain 1980.
52 Civic duty is measured on a 1–5 scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ with the statement
‘I would be seriously neglecting my duty as a citizen if I didn’t vote.’ Household duty is measured by whether or
not at least one other member of the subject respondent’s household agrees or strongly agrees (values 4 and 5)
with this statement.
53 Both of these variables are coded on a 1–5 scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).
54 Personal beneﬁts: respondents were presented with the following statement: ‘I feel a satisfaction when
I vote’ (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Feelings towards a party variable: ‘On a scale from 0–10
(0 means = dislike; 10 = strongly like), how do you feel about the Labour/Conservative/Liberal Democrat
Party?’ The highest value was taken as a measure of feelings towards their most-favoured party.
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other control variables including external efﬁcacy, (the perceived personal inﬂuence on the
election outcome); political costs (though, as mentioned above, we do not have a measure of the
social dimension of political costs); political interest; and conventional socio-economic
variables including sex, age and education.55
ANALYSIS
Table 2 provides some preliminary evidence that the two key variables – household civic duty
and household partisanship – are associated with vote intention and vote. The intention to vote
rate for respondents living in households where another household member scores four or more
out of ﬁve on civic duty is just over 72 per cent, compared to around 64 per cent in the sample
as a whole. For vote, the rate for ‘dutiful households’ is 82 per cent compared to 75 per cent for
the overall sample. The presence of other household members who share the same party
identiﬁcation with the respondent also has a strong bivariate relationship with vote intention.
Just over 84 per cent of citizens who live in a household where there is another member who
identiﬁes with the same party said they intended to vote, compared to 72 per cent for sole
identiﬁers in a household. The equivalent ﬁgure for vote is 89 per cent compared to 79 per cent
for sole identiﬁers. Because the rate for shared partisans exceeds that for sole partisans, we can
be reasonably conﬁdent that it is not attributable to individual-level partisanship, but to the
sharing of partisanship with social intimates. Interestingly, however, respondents who live with
an identiﬁer of a different party are also more likely to vote than sole partisans – 7 per cent more
likely to intend to vote and 6.7 per cent more likely to vote – suggesting that there are some
effects of cross-pressures in the household for both intention and vote. This suggests that while
partisan disagreement may be detrimental for turnout when compared to agreement,56
TABLE 2 Consumption Beneﬁts by Vote Intention (eight to ten) and Vote
Variables
Intend to
vote (%)
Do not intend
to vote (%) Voted (%)
Did not
vote (%)
Household Civic Duty 72.3 27.7 82.2 17.8
Individual Civic Duty* 83.5 16.5 86.3 13.7
Descriptive Norms* 72.7 27.3 81.1 18.9
No Party Identiﬁcation 56.9 43.1 60.6 39.4
Opposing Partisanship 78.7 21.3 85.7 14.3
Sole Partisanship 71.7 28.3 79.0 21.0
Shared Partisanship 84.4 15.6 88.5 11.5
Overall Vote Intention 64.4 35.6 – –
Overall Vote – – 75.2 24.8
N 8,337 8,337 1,657 1,657
Note: for individual civic duty and descriptive norms, we use a combination of agree and
strongly agree.
55 Perceived political inﬂuence: ‘On a scale from 0–10, where 0 = very unlikely and 10 = very likely, how
likely is it that your vote will make a difference in terms of which party wins the election in this constituency at
the next general election?’ Political costs: ‘It takes too much time and effort to be active in politics and public
affairs’ (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). For political interest: ‘How interested would you say you
were in politics’ (1 = not at all interested; 5 = very interested).
56 Mutz 2006.
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even disagreeable partisan views among other household members may be more favourable to
turnout than a complete lack of partisan attachment. This may be attributable to the impact of
stronger social norms of voting among partisans of all parties, which we address in the
multivariate analysis below.
Although Table 2 provides some prima facie evidence, it is more than likely that many of
these differences are due to other sources of homogeneity within households. As well as being
more likely to interact with and inﬂuence each other, people who live in the same household
tend to be more alike in many ways, including their socio-economic characteristics and political
interest. The process of interpersonal inﬂuence may therefore lead to household correlations in
other attitudes or interests. In the following multivariate multilevel model of vote intention we
therefore control for these effects.
Table 3 shows multilevel logistic models of vote intention for alternative model
speciﬁcations. Model 1 shows the coefﬁcients for the norms model including household
relational norms (household civic duty), descriptive norms and personal normative beliefs
(individual civic duty) as well as all the control variables discussed above. As hypothesized, we
ﬁnd that household civic duty has a signiﬁcant positive effect on vote intention even when
allowing for individual civic duty and descriptive norms of voting (both of which are also
strongly signiﬁcant). Reassuringly, the vote models (Appendix Table A1) conﬁrm the ﬁndings
of the vote intention models, with slightly larger effects for relational norms. Model 1 also
suggests that individual beneﬁts – personal efﬁcacy and satisfaction from voting – are all
signiﬁcant and in the direction expected. As expected, individual-level civic duty has a strong
positive impact on intention, although group beneﬁts do not. Political interest, age and
education are also signiﬁcant, with older, highly educated individuals and those most interested
in politics more likely to intend to vote.
Model 2 introduces relational expressive motives while removing the normative motives. As
hypothesized, respondents who share a party identiﬁcation with another household member are
signiﬁcantly more likely to intend to vote than sole identiﬁers. This is conﬁrmed in the vote
model (Table A1). Non-identiﬁers are much less likely to intend to vote, which, when compared
to the base category (sole identiﬁers), indicates the impact of individual-level party
identiﬁcation. However, in the vote intention model, opposing identiﬁers are equally likely to
vote as shared identiﬁers, suggesting the critical factor may be shared norms and expectations of
participation rather than enhanced expressive beneﬁts via common partisanship. This possibility
is explored further in Model 3, which simultaneously includes relational normative and
expressive motives. It should be noted, however, that unlike shared identiﬁcation, opposing
identiﬁcation does not have a signiﬁcant effect in the vote model (Table A1).
When norms and expressive motives are included together (Model 3), we ﬁnd that shared
partisanship is still signiﬁcant, while opposing identiﬁcation is marginally insigniﬁcant,
although the magnitude of the effects are not greatly different.57 The effect for shared
identiﬁcation is conﬁrmed when positive vote intention is deﬁned as scores of 10 only
(Table A2), though in this model opposing identiﬁcation is also signiﬁcant. In the reported vote
model (Table A1) both effects are marginally insigniﬁcant although the magnitude is very
similar, reﬂecting the reduced sample size. The relative effect sizes for the vote intention model
are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the predicted probabilities for different combinations of
57 In the vote model the effect sizes are similar, but due to a small N are statistically insigniﬁcant in the full
model. Because it is likely that the effect of shared partisanship may be mediated by enhanced expressive
beneﬁts, we ran an alternate model without party feeling scores (Model 3a). Shared partisanship is indeed
signiﬁcant when this is removed, suggesting partial mediation.
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TABLE 3 Multilevel Logistic Model of Vote Intention (eight to ten)
Variables
Model 1 VI
(Norms) β (SE)
Model 2 VI
(Expressive) β (SE)
Model 3 VI (Full
model) β (SE)
Constant − 5.61* − 3.35* − 5.33*
(0.24) (0.21) (0.26)
Expressive social
Household Partisanship
(base = sole identiﬁer)
Non-identiﬁer – − 0.64* − 0.59*
(0.10) (0.08)
Opposing identiﬁcation – 0.57* 0.36
(0.19) (0.19)
Shared identiﬁcation – 0.56* 0.45*
(0.11) (0.11)
Expressive individual
Feelings Towards Party – 0.18* 0.17*
(0.02) (0.02)
Personal normative
Beliefs
Civic Duty 0.82* – 0.78*
(0.04) (0.04)
Relational norms
Civic Duty (Household) 0.52* – 0.33*
(0.08) (0.09)
Descriptive norms 0.25* – 0.25*
(0.04) (0.04)
Individual beneﬁts
Personal Inﬂuence 0.14* 0.12* 0.09*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Satisfaction 0.54* 0.74* 0.45*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Group beneﬁts
Group Beneﬁts 0.03 0.08* − 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Costs
Political Costs − 0.18* − 0.12 − 0.19*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Household size
(Base = Single-Person Households)
Two-Person Households − 0.18* − 0.07 − 0.28*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Three-Person Households − 0.44* − 0.42* − 0.66*
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
Controls
Political Interest 0.68* 0.54* 0.42*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Gender (Male) 0.03 − 0.01 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Age (Base = Middle 30–44)
Young Age <25 − 0.10 − 0.28* − 0.17
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Mid/Older Age 45–59 0.40* 0.38* 0.36*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Old Age 60 plus 0.57* 0.71* 0.53*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
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household partisanship by household size with other variables set at their median values.
As well as demonstrating the lower propensity of non-partisans to vote, we see that in multiple-
voter households, there is very little difference between shared and opposing partisans, but both
have higher levels of turnout intention than individuals who are the only party identiﬁers in the
household. The enhanced turnout where party identiﬁcation is shared between household
members is consistent with Hypothesis 2, derived from the theoretical expectations of
expressive voting – that having a shared party identiﬁcation with social intimates should
enhance the motivation to vote. However, since we see a similar effect for opposing partisans
(as noted above), this suggests that shared norms and mutually supporting behaviour may be a
more important explanation.
This interpretation is supported by Figure 2, which shows the effect sizes for household duty
by household size derived from Model 3, providing clear support for Hypothesis 1. Civic duty
of household members has a large and signiﬁcant impact on vote intention over and above the
TABLE 3 (Continued )
Variables
Model 1 VI
(Norms) β (SE)
Model 2 VI
(Expressive) β (SE)
Model 3 VI (Full
model) β (SE)
Degree 0.05 0.17* 0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Random effects
Between-Household Variance 0.61* 0.68* 0.59*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Variance Partition Coefﬁcient 0.16 0.17 0.15
Joint Chi-Square Test (1 Df) 44.21* 56.41* 39.11*
N 8,337 8,337 8,337
Note: signiﬁcant at< 0.05 level. The estimation method is penalized quasi-likelihood.
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respondents’ own level of civic duty and regardless of household size. For example, persons
living in two-elector households in which other members regard it a duty to vote have a
predicted probability of voting of 0.75, compared to 0.68 for similar people living with other
electors who do not regard voting as a duty. Moreover, turnout in two-elector households in
which other members do not regard it a duty to vote is considerably lower than in single-voter
households. However, for persons living in two-elector households where other members do
regard it a duty to vote, turnout is slightly higher than that of similar people in single-elector
households. This is conﬁrmed in the reported vote model, which has a slightly larger effect for
household civic duty than the vote intention model (Table A1, Model 3). This provides support
for the hypothesis that social norms that are externally validated and enforced through close
social relationships are important drivers of turnout. This effect is over and above the role of
internalized social norms as reﬂected in individual-level attitudes towards voting. In other
words, it is not necessarily sufﬁcient to believe in a duty to vote; it is also important to be
connected to others who also believe in that duty.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have set out the basis for a relational theory of voting that incorporates
external–selective consumption motivations. We emphasize that relational selective
consumption beneﬁts contain both normative and expressive elements that are underpinned
by shared partisan identity and interpersonal inﬂuence. Our aim has been to develop a
theoretical framework that accounts for the tendency of families, households and networks to
vote together – that is, that when one person in a family turns out to vote, on the whole, others
do too. More generally, our contention is that voting is not only an act driven by a motivation to
achieve political goals, but a social activity that, like other social activities, reﬂects many
circumstantial factors and inﬂuences, deﬁned by the voter’s social situation. The voting decision
is a multilevel process in which the turnout behaviour of voters sharing the same context is
correlated. This correlation arises because within a household, network or locale, each
individual’s incentive to participate is connected to others through channels of interpersonal
inﬂuence, shared identities and anticipated interactions.
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Building on this theoretical approach, we identiﬁed household voting norms and expressive
voting as determining the key relational selective consumption beneﬁts that might help explain
household clustering in turnout (Hypothesis 2). Using household hierarchical data, we have
demonstrated that the social norms of other household members are important factors in
explaining turnout, even when allowing for the role of internalized social norms (or civic duty) at
the individual level (Hypothesis 1). Secondly, in accordance with expectations of expressive
theories of voting,58 having a shared party identiﬁcation with social intimates does indeed enhance
the motivation to vote. However, contrary to expectations of theories of disagreement and
ambivalence,59 there was some evidence that even opposing partisanship is associated with higher
levels of turnout. This strengthens the case that social norms are particularly important, a claim
supported by the combined model of relational norms and expressive motives on voter turnout.
To varying degrees, each of the motivations to vote can be linked directly to membership of
social networks or social groups. In this article we have focused on relational factors that
explain voting intention. We have argued that these relational factors are distinct from internal
social inﬂuences in that they require interaction (or anticipated future interactions) with social
intimates and are not necessarily manifested in personal normative beliefs. For example, even
where an individual expresses belief in the norm of voting, the pressure of social intimates
sharing that norm – and thereby potentially holding the individual to account – had an
independent and additional effect on the likelihood of voting. This is likely to be especially true
in households where members can observe each other’s voting behaviour. We have shown that
contextually driven variations in the relational consumption beneﬁts of voting – shared party
identiﬁcation and household norms – can help explain both why citizens vote and why turnout
is socially clustered. Moreover, although it is beyond the scope of this article, the
relational theory proposed here has important implications for the study of turnout behaviour
over the life course – ageing,60 life-cycle effects,61 and how voting is subject to habit
or inertia62 – and by extension to understanding long-term political change. Future research
should test our social-dynamic theory of voting where the social context at any one point in the
life course can have spill-over effects on electoral participation later in life. Key life events such
as leaving home, receiving higher education, getting a job, moving home, getting married,
having children, retirement and widowhood are all associated with changes in the extent to
which citizens live and interact with other voters or non-voters, which may have lasting effects
on turnout. In other words, turnout patterns over the life course are (in part) the product of
changing relational selective consumption costs and beneﬁts, and inertia.
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